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By December 2005 National Health Service (NHS) patients who may require elective 
surgery will be offered a choice of four to five hospitals at the referral stage, as part of 
the government’s vision for a responsive, patient-centric health service.  The 
Healthcare Management Research Group of Cranfield Postgraduate Medical School 
has been working with Bedford Hospital NHS Trust to evaluate the possible 
implications of patient choice, and this document provides an overview of the current 
situation and predicted changes. 
 
During February and March 2004 a number of meetings were held with key NHS 
stakeholders, including Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs), Primary Care Trusts 
(PCTs) and General Practitioners (GPs) in Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire, 
Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire and Northamptonshire, and also the Department of 
Health in London.  Conclusions from these interviews form the core of the research 
and are reinforced by a literature review of academic papers, news articles, books, 
government guidelines and opinion surveys.   In particular, the process by which 
PCTs commission secondary care providers is assessed and the nine pilot schemes 
are evaluated.  The Department of Health’s report on pilots also provides a valuable 
insight into the practicalities of offering choice.  Lessons learned from healthcare 
systems around the world are compared with current policy in the NHS, and finally 
there is critique of the challenges to the implementation of choice.  
 
Summary of major findings: 
• Traditionally patients’ choice of secondary care provider has been restricted by 
referral from their GP.  The patient choice initiative today is still fairly limited, 
pertaining to elective surgery patients only and a choice of time and location for 
surgery from a predefined list.  GPs will still act as gatekeepers for patients to 
access consultants and specialists and patients will be further constrained by the 
list of providers allocated by their local PCT.   
• Evidence from the pilot schemes is incomplete and conclusions are drawn from 
two evaluations, one for choice at the point of referral and one for choice at six 
months.  Ease of access was the priority for patients in the pilot scheme at 
Executive Summary 
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referral stage, followed by the reputation of hospital.  In the Cardiac Heart 
Disease (CHD) pilot the reputation of the hospital was patients’ main concern, 
then waiting time.   
• Evidence also points towards patients choosing to stay in their local hospital as 
they felt they lacked sufficient information on alternative providers.  The quality 
and level of detail in the information provided to patients will be instrumental in 
the uptake of choice.   
• There is still the need to address long-term capacity; many solutions offered have 
been short-term, such as using overseas teams and the private sector.   
• The two main opportunities for hospitals under choice are to increase activity 
through taking on patients from PCTs struggling with choice at six months and to 
find areas to improve efficiency and cost-effectiveness to maximise the benefit 
from tariffs.   
• Excessive change in the NHS during the last 20 years has resulted in 
disillusionment and scepticism towards any new initiative, and the choice agenda 
is seen to be politically motivated, suggesting that the cultural barrier to an 
effective implementation of choice will be great.  
• Patients value the offer of choice even if they opted for treatment in their local 
hospital so satisfaction with the NHS may improve as patients feel they are being 
involved in decisions.   
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1 Introduction 
 
 
The NHS was founded on the value of an equitable service that is free to everyone at 
the point of delivery and funded by the tax payer, costing £57 billion a year to run at 
the end of 2003 and expected to rise to £76 billion by 2005 [Department of Health, 
2003].  The level of resources allocated to the NHS in national plans from 2003 to 
2005 is at record levels, with high growth promised for 2006-2008.  In the budget 
announced on the 17th March 2004, Gordon Brown reaffirmed his pledge to an 
increase in health spending of 7.2%.  However, spending on healthcare is outpacing 
economic growth:  from 2000 to 2001 spending in OECD countries increased on 
average by 4%, whereas real GDP growth was around 2.3% [OECD, 2003].   
 
The final Wanless Report, published in February 2004, concluded that “the UK must 
expect to devote a significantly larger share of its national income to health care over 
the next 20 years … to catch up with the standards of care seen in other countries … 
success or failure will ultimately depend on how effectively the health service uses its 
resources” [Wanless, 2004].  The main challenges to governments today are 
increasingly expensive drugs and technology, the progressively ageing population 
and a rise in chronic conditions, while health policy, in particular the financing and 
provision of health care, is the most high profile item on the political agenda [Dixon 
and Robinson, 2003] so any reforms are subject to intense scrutiny.   
 
The public is more likely to be willing to pay for a properly funded healthcare if it feels 
that the money is being invested in line with its needs, therefore public opinion often 
steers policy decisions.  Surveys highlight waiting times for elective surgery and 
specialist assessment as the two most important perceived failings of the NHS 
[Jowell et al., 2000], while in a worldwide 2001 survey the vast majority interviewed 
agreed that “fundamental changes” to their health system were required [Blendon et 
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al., 2002].  These are therefore the issues the Government has chosen to address as 
priorities.   
 
Today there are 450,000 more NHS operations and 860,000 more elective 
admissions than in 1997 [EFRS, 2004].  Similarly in this time waiting list numbers 
have reduced by more than 15%, with a current goal of choice to cut the amount of 
time patients spend waiting for surgery [Appelby, 2003].  In addition, the rise of 
consumerism and the service sector have led to heightened expectations among a 
more informed and demanding public; the Government therefore has strong 
incentives to make the NHS more responsive.  “The largely intervention-based 
understanding of medicine, focusing on acute services and the expertise of 
consultants, is being replaced by one based on preventative, holistic and patient-
owned treatment” [Bosanquet and Kruger, 2003].   
 
Tony Blair first raised the issue of choice in his party conference speech in 1999, 
echoing Margaret Thatcher when he said “I want to go to the hospital of my choice, 
on the day I want, at the time I want.  And I want it to be on the NHS” [Blair, 1999].  
However the NHS Plan published in 2000 admitted that the NHS was ill-equipped to 
offer choice as it was “a 1940s system operating in a 21st century world, encumbered 
by over-centralisation, disempowered patients and no real incentives to improve 
performance”.  Choice is currently at its lowest point in the history of the NHS 
[Bromley et al., 2003].  A degree of choice has been available in the past but only to 
those who are articulate and informed enough to demand it or can afford private 
healthcare (currently around 10% of the population).  It has been a long-standing 
tradition in Britain that patients have to be referred to a consultant by their GP.  The 
Patients Charter of 1991 declared that as a patient you should “be referred to a 
consultant, acceptable to you when your GP thinks it is necessary” [Lilley, 2000].  
NHS (General Medical Services) regulations in 1992 also state that “general 
practitioners may arrange for the referral of patients, as appropriate, for the provision 
of services”.  The Patients Charter was abolished in 2000, but the status of GPs as 
gatekeepers to consultants has not changed, due to the efficiency gains and cost 
savings in limiting access to specialists.  Patients today have a wider range of 
primary care options to choose from, including walk-in centres and NHS Direct, and 
in theory can choose their GP. However in reality many practices are oversubscribed 
and choice of hospital is essentially restricted to those with whom the Primary Care 
Trust (PCT) has a contract.   
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2 Background to 
recent reforms 
 
 
During the last twenty years there have been regular upheavals in the infrastructure 
of the NHS.  In 1989 NHS trusts, GP fundholders and the NHS Executive were 
established under the ‘internal market’, separating the function of purchasing 
healthcare from the function of providing it [Propper, Burgess and Gossard, 2003].  
This meant that local health authorities and larger GP practices had the power to 
purchase healthcare for their patients.  Fundholders negotiated a contract with each 
hospital, giving fundholders real clout but meaning that trusts were inundated with 
contracts.  GPs could make extra-contractual referrals (ECRs), but these only 
accounted for 2% of hospital expenditure and the majority were for emergency or 
tertiary services [Lilley, 2000].  Fundholding ended in 1997 and in 1999 ECRs were 
abolished and primary care groups (PCGs) were established. PCGs negotiated 
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) on the basis of the forecast needs of all patients in 
their area for at least three years ahead, so choice was restricted as patients now 
had to follow the money.   
 
The NHS Plan in 2000 set out ambitious ten year targets for reform, including shorter 
waits for hospitals and GPs, more doctors, nurses and beds, modern IT systems, 
cleaner wards with better food and greater power for patients [NHS Plan, 2000].  This 
was partly in response to criticism that spending has been without adequate reforms 
to ensure the funding is used effectively.  Peter Lilley MP is one of these critics: “a 
key feature of the March 2000 budget was setting targets to spend more money on 
health.  But spending more money as an end in itself is bizarre – it needs to be used 
more efficiently and in ways which satisfy patients’ desires rather than bureaucratic 
needs” [Lilley, 2000].  Even with the record level of funding at the end of the 1990s 
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the standard in the NHS was still well below the European average [Walker, 2001].  
In 2001 the Chancellor of the Exchequer concurred that “alongside the extra 
resources must come more reform and modernisation”, and subsequently 
commissioned Derek Wanless, former CEO of NatWest Bank, to “undertake a review 
of the long-term trends affecting the health service in the UK” [Wanless, 2002].   
 
Prior to receiving the Wanless Report, the Government published ‘Shifting the 
Balance of Power’ (July 2001), defining a programme of structural and cultural 
change to empower frontline staff and patients to attain the targets laid out in the 
NHS Plan.  The Modernisation Agency was established in April 2001 to lead the 
changes, with an advisory role to translate the NHS Plan into reality.  It is also a 
centre of excellence, identifying and disseminating best practice.  The National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) is a Special Health Authority to channel 
funding into the most cost-effective treatments and to advocate equal access to 
these treatments.  Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) were created in place of the 
Regional Health Authorities, reporting directly to the Department of Health.  SHAs are 
responsible for developing strategies within the NHS in line with government 
initiatives, ensuring that hospital trusts and PCTs plan and deliver on projects such 
as implementing patient choice. PCTs control 75% of the NHS budget and oversee 
the health services in their local area to ensure that the local community has the care 
it requires.  This devolving of power was the first stage in meeting the aims laid out in 
Shifting the Balance of Power and achieving a primary care-led service.  Figure 1 
shows the current structure of the NHS since 2002. 
 
The final Wanless Report followed in April 2002 and concluded that “the UK has 
fallen behind other countries in health outcomes.  We have achieved less because 
we have spent very much less and not spent it well” [Wanless, 2002]. Other key 
points raised include the goal of a population ‘fully engaged’ in improving its health, 
with faster access, a personalised service and high quality care and informed choice.  
‘Delivering the NHS Plan’, published in April 2002, sets out the goal of a more 
responsive healthcare system that allows patients to choose the hospital they receive 
treatment in, along the lines of the system in Scandinavia where patients who have 
waited for too long can opt for treatment elsewhere, and are provided with 
information on waiting times and the various options for treatment.  ‘Choice of 
hospitals: Guidance for PCTs, NHS Trusts and SHAs’, July 2003, is the main policy 
guidance document, setting out the next steps to deliver the NHS Plan.  The ‘Fair for 
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all and personal to you’ consultation was launched in August 2003 to debate 
questions around choice and equality.  ‘Building on the best - choice, responsiveness 
and equity’ (December 2003) followed in reaction to this consultation, building on the 
NHS Plan and outlining the next steps in patient-centred care.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the NHS [http://www.nhs.uk/thenhsexplained/howthenhsworks] 
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3 Current policy 
on choice 
 
 
3.1 Overview 
 
Waiting, Booking and Choice is part of the wider strategy to give all patients fast and 
convenient access to health and social care services, including emergency and 
primary care. [NHS Modernisation Agency, 2003].  There are four major goals to 
Waiting, Booking and Choice. By the end of 2004, patients will be able to see a GP 
within two working days or another primary care professional within one working day; 
in addition, patients will wait no more than four hours in A&E.  From 30th April 2004, 
choice at six months means that patients who have been on a waiting list for elective 
surgery for more than six months will be offered the opportunity to move to another 
provider for faster treatment.  By December 2005 patients who may require elective 
surgery will be offered a choice of four to five hospitals at the referral stage, with 
waiting lists being replaced by booked appointments, underpinned by the roll-out of a 
national Electronic Booking System (EBS).   
 
The technology to support choice will therefore be instrumental in the success or 
failure of the scheme, so that GPs and their patients can book a convenient 
appointment on the spot.  GPs will only be able to access information on the four to 
five providers chosen by the PCT.  Government guidelines for choice at six months 
state that each patient will be supported in their choice by a combination of the GP, 
primary care team, practice staff and a booking management service [Department of 
Health, 2003].  Patient Care Advisors (PCAs) have proved indispensable in the pilot 
schemes, but whether they will be retained under choice at the point of referral, or 
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amalgamated into call centres, has yet to be decided, and is likely to depend on each 
PCT.   Transport must be provided by the PCT for patients, and possibly relatives 
and carers, if this would prevent them from otherwise choosing an alternative 
provider.   
 
Subsequent sections of this report will now look at the fundamental aspects of the 
choice agenda in more depth, firstly focusing on the new funding system to facilitate 
patient movement between providers, followed by the process for PCT 
commissioning.  The new performance measures are assessed along with the 
information requirements for patients, and then there is an outline of the plans for 
expanding capacity. Finally, the likelihood of a market arising for elective surgery and 
the idea of trusts advertising for patients are discussed. 
 
 
3.2 Funding 
 
 “The key to making choice effective within a public service like the NHS is to make 
the taxpayers’ money follow the patient’s choice to fund the hospital they select” 
[Lilley, 2000].  The use of stronger market incentives has emerged as a dominant 
theme in the Government’s reforms [Lewis, Dixon and Gillam, 2003].  The 
Department of Health is overhauling the financial flows of the NHS, in particular the 
way in which hospitals are funded.  As patients move around the system, hospitals 
need to be reimbursed for the work they do; from April 2003, phased implementation 
of ‘Payment by Results’ was introduced, based on similar schemes operating in the 
US, Australia, France and Scandinavia [Harrison and Appelby, 2004].   
 
Payment by results incorporates three key themes.  Firstly, there will be the 
introduction of national tariffs, developed using national Healthcare Resource Group 
analysis of treatments and costs, adjusted by a market forces factor (MFF) for 
geographical differences in cost. The aim of tariffs is to standardise the cost of 
treatments across the whole of the NHS in order to eradicate price discrepancies and 
price competition within the health service.  Commissioners (PCTs) will be able to 
focus on the quality and volume of the services that they are obtaining from the trusts 
without the need to enter into lengthy price negotiations.  This in turn will encourage 
trusts to improve the efficiency of their services whilst allowing them to keep track of 
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their costs.  Cost and volume are the second factors in payment by results, steering 
the commissioning process away from traditional historically-based budgets, as 
payment to the trusts will be based on the volume of work that they carry out.  This 
will provide an incentive for trusts to increase their activity in order to achieve realistic 
reductions in patient waiting times.  The third factor concerns case mix.  Case mix 
refers to different patients requiring a variety of differing treatments, e.g. a mix of 
routine treatments to more complicated surgery, so in short, case mix refers to 
varying amounts of complexity in the cases that a trust or specialties within a trust 
deal with.  It is for this case mix, along with the amount of cases that they see, that 
trusts will be financially rewarded.   
 
The current system for out of area treatments (OATs) will also be overhauled as part 
of the financial reforms.  There is a payment system of two years unless agreed up 
front with the originating PCT that the receiving trust will be paid within one year. 
Extra-contractual referrals also led to disputes over who paid, and similar problems 
exist with OATs.  For 2004-5, OATs will continue, adjusted in line with national tariffs 
based on data from 2003-03.  Then from April 2005 OATs will be replaced, probably 
by direct payments for each activity outside of Service Level Agreements (SLAs), 
supported by risk sharing with the PCT based on historical levels of activity 
[Department of Health, 2004]. 
 
Through the new measures outlined above, payment by results will play a crucial role 
in the implementation of patient choice as the money will follow the patient and it will 
increase the accountability and efficiency within the trusts. As trusts are being paid 
by each activity this should drive efficiency and productivity as hospitals that can 
carry our more procedures will bring in more funding.  The changes to the NHS 
financial system are being introduced gradually; between 2003 and 2005 a limited 
number of tariffs and commissioning by cost and volume are being implemented.  
These will be applied to most activities within the trusts between 2005 and 2008 with 
full implementation of payment by results scheduled for 2008.  By 2005 the system 
will account for around 60% of hospitals’ total incomes with the goal that by 2005-6 
all services will be covered by a national tariff. 
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3.3 Commissioning 
 
When PCTs were founded it was the intention that they “have a great deal of 
flexibility in commissioning in line with their patients’ and populations’ needs … they 
will be able to choose the best way and place to deliver services for their patients, 
knowing that funding can follow” [Department of Health, 2003].  Shifting the Balance 
of Power in the NHS was clear in its intention to put the planning, commissioning and 
delivery of services closer to frontline NHS staff. The result was recognition that 
PCTs would have to take on significant extra responsibility 
[http://www.natpact.nhs.uk].  PCTs are therefore pivotal in the NHS, forming a link 
between the Department of Health and secondary care whilst also working closely 
with primary care providers such as doctors, dentists, pharmacists and social care.  
Part of their role will be in ensuring equity, through “articulating marginalised 
interests” [Lewis, 2003]. 
 
“Commissioning is the process by which PCTs identify the health needs of their 
population and make prioritised decisions to secure care to meet those needs within 
available resources.  It includes longer term strategic planning, medium term 
planning (3 year local delivery plans) and the shorter term agreement and 
performance management of Service Level Agreements” [http://www.natpact.nhs.uk, 
2004].  PCTs are effectively a replacement for fundholding [Butler, 2002], as their 
remit and purchasing power are comparable.  Each PCT has an overall budget as 
specified by the Department of Health.  With this budget it commissions work from a 
variety of trusts, usually within the local area, negotiating a contract with each trust 
and entering into a SLA.  The amount of funding that is agreed between the two is 
largely based on historical levels – the budget from previous years adjusted for 
inflation.  There is no real account of where the money is actually going and what 
precise activities it is spent on. It seems to be enough for the PCT and trust to agree 
on the funding figure and the hospital then uses the money in which ever way it sees 
fit to ensure that there is enough capacity to enable access and treatment for the 
local population.  This type of system is known as a block agreement or contract.  
Bedford Hospital receives annual funding of around £100 million. Bedford PCT is the 
lead commissioner, as it accounts for 68%; Bedfordshire Heartlands contributes 31% 
and the remaining 1% is from Luton PCT.  Therefore, each PCT has a portfolio of 
SLAs to manage with the Lead responsible for monitoring quality, attending regular 
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meetings with the trust and reporting back to the other commissioners.  The PCT has 
a database of all the trusts they have SLAs with and the specialties they offer.   
 
The main change in commissioning with the onset of payment by results will be the 
shift from the present system of block contracts to a more targeted approach.  
Initially, therefore, the volumes agreed with providers are likely to be lower than 
historic levels to allow for the uncertainty inherent in choice, and this may be 
disturbing for trusts.  Commissioning is intended to be dynamic so that PCTs can 
change the volumes purchased from individual providers during the year, and may 
need to be a collaborative effort between PCTs to help spread the risk.  As the basic 
foundation is to pay a hospital by each activity, providers will be paid according to 
what they deliver and when they do not the PCT has adequate funding to find an 
alternative provider.  PCTs must offer a choice of four providers as a minimum, with 
five the ideal and no maximum number of providers.   
 
Originally the Government intended to include both a private sector and an overseas 
provider on every PCT list for choice, but has since withdrawn this proviso; PCTs can 
still use the private sector if the cost is equivalent to national tariff.  An issue PCTs 
face is that local services have grown up over time and according to demand, so are 
essentially reactive and based on historical data.  With changing demographics, such 
as population increases in certain areas (Milton Keynes for example), the needs of 
local populations have changed and PCTs are now struggling to align supply and 
demand.  Rather than offer a greater choice under the new system, some PCTs see 
this as an opportunity to reduce their portfolio and reorganise local services more 
effectively.  PCTs and GPs also hope patient choice will eliminate the need for OATs, 
since patients will all be offered a choice as standard so the PCT has better grounds 
to refuse.   
 
“The new general medical services contract will increase the commissioning power of 
PCTs, as they will be able to create a market for enhanced and additional services 
and to develop new forms of out-of-hours care” [Lewis, Dixon and Gillam, 2003].  The 
new GMS is a “quality-based contract” [NHS Plan, 2000] paying GPs a basic retainer 
and they can earn more by providing services over and above this; one example 
being specialist care for drug addicts.  The goal is that increasingly GPs will 
specialise and the routine work will be done by nurses and healthcare practitioners 
with the expansion of their roles through additional training.  
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3.4 Performance measurement 
and accountability 
 
The UK has one of the worst rates of hospital-acquired infections in the developed 
world with approximately 9% of hospital beds being occupied by patients who have 
caught an infection since arrival [Lilley, 2000].  If choice succeeds in driving up 
quality then this would be a major advantage of the policy.  From April 2004, the new 
Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection (CHAI) will take on the role of 
independent inspection across all healthcare providers, both in the NHS and the 
private sector.  National Service Frameworks (NSF) set standards and put in place 
strategies for policy implementation and performance measures.   
 
The trend towards accountability has been widespread and most countries are now 
running initiatives to publish information on the performance of providers as part of 
ongoing measurement and improvement cycles [Hurst, 2002].  Death rates and life 
expectancies have traditionally been used as measures for a nation’s progress, and 
mortality rates are used commonly for assessing hospitals.  However, actual 
performance measurement is far more complex than this [Donnison, 1994].   The 
NHS Information Authority has an overall remit to “improve patient care and achieve 
best value for money by working with NHS professionals, suppliers and academics 
and others to provide national products, services and standards, which support the 
sharing and most efficient and effective use of information“ [http://www.nhsia.nhs.uk].   
 
The Department of Health has also worked with focus groups and pilot projects to 
determine the information requirements for patients and GPs to make an informed 
choice.  Four main areas have been defined - waiting times, convenience, patient 
experience and clinical quality/reputation.  The nhs.uk website already provides the 
first two, and there are plans to add clinical quality and patient experiences.  Waiting 
times will be linked to the EBS system anyway as the patient will be receiving a 
booked appointment.   
 
A new website, www.makingthechoice.org, went live in April 2004: “This website tells 
you which hospitals are available in your area and gives you information about their 
location, facilities and performance. It also gives you detailed information about the 
specialists who work in each hospital, their qualifications, special interests and the 
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likely time you will have to wait to see them for an appointment. Comparator tools 
enable you to compare a hospital or specialist's performance with others in areas 
such as clinical excellence and waiting times” [www.makingthechoice.org]. 
 
Patients can search for the information under their SHA in four different ways:  
1.  Looking up a doctor by name, with more information on where they work, their 
qualifications, special interests and waiting times. 
2.  Finding the doctors with the shortest waiting lists that treat a particular 
condition: 
a.  by specialty 
b.  by illness or the type of operation required 
3.  Location of each hospital 
4.  A comparison of hospitals in the area 
 
Figures 2 illustrates the patient interface, with a summary of performance information 
on a trust. 
 
The Wanless Report recommends the ideal state of a population ‘fully engaged’ in 
healthcare to make the service more responsive, determine the needs of the local 
population, reduce the costs of healthcare through prevention and eventually improve 
outcomes.  The Government is embarking on this by setting up forums and ‘expert 
patient’ schemes, and these support the choice policy by determining patients’ views 
and needs while enhancing accountability.  The Commission for Patient and Public 
Involvement in Health (CPPIH) is responsible for 552 Public Patient Involvement 
Forums (PPIF) across the country, to deliver the promise of more public participation 
in healthcare.  Each PPIF is supported by a not-for-profit Forum Support 
Organisation (FSO) and aims to share information between patients, public and 
decision-makers. [http://www.cppih.org.uk].  Patient Advice and Liaison Services 
(PALS) are a central part of the new system of PPI in England, offering confidential 
advice and support, information on the NHS and health related matters, explanations 
of NHS complaints procedures and a focal point for feedback from patients to inform 
service developments and an early warning system for NHS trusts, Primary Care 
Trusts and Patient and Public Involvement Forums by monitoring trends and gaps in 
services and reporting these to the trust management for action. PALS act 
independently.  Also under CPPIH is the Independent Complaints and Advocacy 
Service (ICAS).   
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Figure 2: Patient choice website [http://www.makingthechoice.org] 
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‘Expert patient’ schemes for chronic conditions are to be rolled out to every PCT, 
allowing patients a more active role in their treatment.  The Department of Health 
report ‘A New Approach to Chronic Disease Management for the 21st Century’ 
summarises the aims: “an observation often made by health professionals who 
undertake long-term care of people with particular chronic diseases … is “my patient 
understands their disease better than I do.” This knowledge and experience held by 
the patient has for too long been an untapped resource.  Research and practical 
experience in North America and Britain are showing that today’s patients with 
chronic diseases need not be mere recipients of care. They can become key 
decision-makers in the treatment process” [Department of Health, 2002].  In a speech 
to New National Health Network in July 2003, John Reid, Secretary of State for 
Health, outlined the intention to extend choice beyond elective care into services for 
chronic conditions, primary care and maternity services.  The manner in which this 
will be achieved is still under consideration. 
 
 
3.5 Capacity 
 
Patient choice is dependent on increased capacity and diversity, as patients 
exercising choice will require a broader range of services to meet their respective 
needs.  The NHS Plan recognises that the NHS cannot expand fast enough to meet 
choice at six months by December 2005, so independent provision is being used 
where there are bottlenecks.  Capacity could be met by NHS trusts, Foundation 
Trusts, treatment centres, private hospitals and possibly overseas, with the last three 
fundamental to meeting capacity requirements [Department of Health, 2003].  One 
aim in the Wanless Report is for more work to be carried out in primary care and in 
the community, which will free up capacity in secondary care.  By 2005, 75% of 
elective surgery is to be performed by day surgery [NHS Plan, 2000].  In most OECD 
countries there has been a decline in acute beds per capita, on average from 5.7 in 
1980 to 4 in 2000 per 1,000 population [OECD, 2003] due to an increase in day 
surgery.  Australia, for example, is currently working to achieve 50% of elective 
surgery as day procedures, with a longer-term goal of 85% [Hurst and Siciliani, 
2003].   
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Treatment centres are instrumental in achieving day surgery targets in the UK.  They 
are new, stand-alone units for specialties that have traditionally had the longest 
waiting times, offering fast, pre-booked day surgery and diagnostic procedures [NHS 
Modernisation Agency, 2003].  As they are specialist units there is no pressure from 
A&E, so patients are unlikely to face cancellations and delays.  Treatment centres 
are designed to process a relatively small number of procedures at high volume and, 
as the majority of procedures will be day cases, there is no requirement for friends 
and family to visit so the NHS hopes that more patients will be prepared to travel to 
them.  It can be more cost-effective to carry out procedures in primary care; however 
there will need to be a balance, as economies of scale can often be achieved in 
secondary care [Docteur and Oxley, 2003].   
 
In 2000 the Government signed a concordat with the private sector for acquiring 
spare capacity, overseas medical teams and to take over the management of failing 
NHS trusts.  Private companies can therefore operate services within the NHS, and 
around half of the treatment centres are operated by private companies.  The 
Government is running an Independent Sector Treatment Centre Programme (ISTC), 
which allows PCTs to bid for a number of procedures in the private sector (funded by 
the Department of Health so not from the PCT’s budget).  Overseas treatment has 
also been trialled as another temporary measure to alleviate waiting lists.  Patients 
were first treated overseas through the NHS in 2001, with pilots run by five health 
authorities for routine surgery, using spare capacity in France and Germany.  Often 
this proved to be more cost-effective: an eye operation that cost £6,000 in the UK 
cost £2,000 in Germany [Timmins, 2001].   In a recent pilot scheme, Nottingham 
Trent PCT secured funding from the Department of Health to bring in an overseas 
team for cataract surgery.  As the team were concentrating purely on one procedure, 
with no interruptions from A&E, it proved extremely efficient.  A South African team is 
now coming to Nottingham under the ISTC scheme for five years to cover 
orthopaedic surgery.   
 
There will be no penalties for hospitals with waiting times of over six months under 
choice as the Department of Health has planned for ‘dynamic management’.  The 
EBS will be instrumental in managing demand.  Although the Government has not 
yet decided the exact procedure, it seems likely that an oversubscribed hospital will 
be removed from all but the local PCT’s menu as the waiting time limit approaches, 
to allow access for the local population until the waiting times drop again.  An 
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alternative idea was to allow patients to choose, so that if they want to wait longer 
then they can; however, this creates a conflict with the guarantee that patients can 
always choose their local hospital within the maximum waiting time.  The EBS will be 
therefore be crucial in managing demand.   
 
 
3.6 Competition and marketing 
 
There have been suggestions that the Government is keen to create more of a 
market for elective surgery in the NHS [Timmins, 2003], and that choice will lead to 
greater competition [Appleby, Harrison and Devlin, 2003].  Confidential findings from 
one-day simulations in East Anglia and Manchester, set out in a document from the 
Department of Health’s strategy unit, mentioned that NHS hospitals are likely to start 
advertising for business, marketing either their waits or innovative ways of treatment 
[Timmins, 2003].  Payment by Results is an incentive for hospitals to seek more work 
and attract patients from outside the local area, but the Department of Health does 
not think this will be a major challenge for trusts.  Hospitals already use the media for 
good news stories and can promote themselves through their forums. 
 
Evidence of marketing and the quality of information provided to patients is covered 
in more detail in the following section. 
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4 Pilot schemes 
 
 
4.1 Overview  
 
The advent of the patient choice initiative marks a significant cultural change in the 
long history of the NHS. Although the need to modernise the NHS in a way that is 
responsive to the needs of the local population is widely accepted as a natural way 
forward, how this should be done remains a cause for debate.  Best practice has 
been adopted from other health organisations around the world and there is the 
intention to incorporate learning from the UK pilot schemes.  Figure 3, provides a 
summary of the main pilot schemes. 
 
There are 10 pilot schemes being run in conjunction with the Department of Health 
(Figure 3), in addition to a number of smaller independent projects at various PCTs 
and SHAs around the country.  Most of these are concerned with choice for long 
waiters and have not yet been evaluated so few conclusions have been drawn.  
However two reports have been published; one assessing the Dr Foster website’s 
pilot for choice at the point of referral, and the second concerning the CHD pilot for 
choice at six months.   
 
The pilot schemes currently offering choice can be differentiated in the following 
ways: 
 
• Choice at the point of referral 
• Choice for long waiters 
• Shorter waits to see a GP 
• Keeping inpatient waits under 12 months 
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• Shorter waits to see a consultant 
 
This section will look at each of these themes in turn, beginning with a discussion of 
the two evaluation reports and followed by a summary of the other pilot schemes.   
 
Name of pilot Choice for 
long waiters 
Choice at referral Comments Report 
Dr Foster No Yes  For all electives, run 
with 3 SHAs and 116 
GPs 
Yes 
CHD   6 months  Reevaluating the 
choice offered as 6 
month waiters 
eliminated 
CHD patients across 
the country 
Yes 
Berkshire  6 months No Plastic surgery, general 
surgery, ENT and 
dermatology surgery  
No 
Cataracts 
South 
6 months  Yes, from GP or 
optometrist 
Initially 2 choices rising 
to 4 in 2004 
No 
Dorset & 
Somerset  
6 months No All specialties No 
Greater 
Manchester  
6 months  Moving to choice at 
the point of referral 
ENT, orthopaedics and 
general surgery 
No 
London 
Patient Choice 
Project 
6 months  No Firstly for cataract 
patients extending to 
most elective care 
No 
Surrey & 
Sussex  
6 months  No General and urology 
operations 
No 
Trent  3 months  Some work with 
choice at the point 
of referral 
All specialties  No 
West 
Yorkshire  
6 months  Yes Cataracts No 
 
Figure 3:  An overview of the main patient choice pilot schemes 
 
 
4.2 Dr Foster referral pilot 
 
4.2.1 Overview 
 
In October 2003 a four month pilot scheme was run in collaboration with the 
Department of Health and the Dr Foster website for choice at the point of referral.  
116 GPs from 38 practices in three Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) – Trent; 
Norfolk, Suffolk & Cambridgeshire; and Dorset & Somerset – took part.  
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Patients received a 16-page A5 booklet explaining choice, with information on the 
five local hospitals. This included a brief description, details of transport and parking, 
comparison ratings on clinical quality, access and the environment.  A website, 
www.makingthechoice.org, was set up with wider range of performance measures 
than in the booklet, including details of surgeons’ special interests.  There was also a 
24-hour telephone helpline, staffed by call centre operators with knowledge of quality 
indicators 
 
A summary and analysis of the findings follows. 
 
4.2.2 Factors influencing patients 
 
The final report confirms that patients value being able to exercise choice over when 
and where they are treated, but without raised expectations of being able to travel 
outside the local area.  Only 15% of patients chose not to go to their local hospital.  
The dominant influencing factor in this decision was ease of access, affecting 56% of 
respondents, followed by reputation of hospital (47%) and quality of care (43%).  
Waiting time was the fourth factor, influencing 34% of patients.  Information on quality 
of care was therefore a key consideration and in this instance was more important 
than waiting times.  Under quality of care patients cited knowing people unhappy with 
a local hospital or recommendations from friends or family as important.   
 
Although the main reason for choosing the local hospital was convenience, trust was 
also important.  The main deterrents from choosing the local hospital were clinical 
issues; if a hospital elsewhere specialised in their condition; if the local hospital could 
not provide their particular specialty; or the local hospital had a bad reputation or 
performance rating, then patients were likely to travel elsewhere.  Some patients also 
opted for private treatment.  Patients did not reject their GP’s recommendation and 
many asked their GP’s advice.   
 
4.2.3 GP feedback 
 
Choice was less complicated for GPs to implement than feared, with the average 
consultation time only increasing by 36 seconds.  Rise in delayed referral rose from 
1% to 14%, so there will be administrative costs associated with this.  Concerns were 
  A Review of Patient Choice in the NHS 
 
 
 
 
22 
raised about the implications for GPs as it is easier for GPs to write a referral letter 
when it is fresh in their mind. 
 
65% of GPs had a positive attitude towards offering choice, but these practices had 
agreed to participate in the pilot so it is not necessarily representative of GPs as a 
whole.  Some expressed concern at the requirement to offer all patients choice, due 
to the potential to confuse some patients.   
 
4.2.4 Information  
 
Patients and GPs indicated a desire for more information, as in absence of clear 
indicators of quality elsewhere most patients chose the local hospital on grounds of 
convenience, while for GPs this was the safest option of referring to the hospital and 
consultants they knew best.   
 
Only 8% of participants used the website, though 17% stated that they would have 
done if they knew about it, and only 4% contacted the call centre.  In spite of this 
63% of patients stated that they had questions they wanted or needed to ask their 
GP; 23% said there was something that would have made them decide to go 
elsewhere (what this might be was not specified); and 21% said they would like to 
have known more about the doctor or hospital they were being sent to.  In contrast 
only 2% felt that the consultation time was not long enough and a minority of 10% 
‘Agreed’ or ‘Agreed Strongly’ that they would like to have had more information, as 
opposed to 35% who ‘Disagreed’ or ‘Disagreed Strongly’.  Both patients and GPs felt 
that there was a requirement for more information related to specific consultants or 
treatments, although this was available on the website.  These figures suggest that 
any additional questions the patients had could have been answered by more 
detailed information in the packs or greater awareness of the website and call centre 
where this information could be found.  
 
4.2.5 Travel 
 
There was no effect on the referral pathway as most patients still opted for their local 
hospital; the report concludes that limited numbers of patients will make use of the 
opportunity to access more distant services.  This contradicts the pilots for choice at 
six months and also opinion surveys, in which patients have said they would travel 
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further for better services. Cost of travel was an issue only for a minority of patients 
(10%), but aftercare was a deterrent to travel.  GPs suggested that PCAs could be 
used effectively to provide support concerning travel arrangements for patients 
wishing to go further afield, where GPs knowledge is limited, and this would also 
support the co-ordination of aftercare and communication between parties.  One GP 
commented that ultimately patients will go locally unless there is a problem with the 
service.  Locality therefore has three important reasons for influencing patients: ease 
of access; familiarity and GP recommendation; and aftercare/follow-up.   
 
4.2.6 Recommendations 
 
GPs requested that they have the option not to offer some patients choice; in reality, 
however, they should be able to use their judgement on this when referring.  
Practices will need to set up choice well in advance of the December 2005 deadline 
and this could create extra administrative pressure.  A public awareness campaign 
will be important, so patients have some familiarity before GP appointment, as there 
was some confusion among patients and GPs wasted time explaining the initiative.  
A distinction between choice at the point of referral and choice for long waiters is that 
in the latter patients receive a definite offer of quicker treatment, which most take up, 
whereas at referral there is more uncertainty and the GP may be unwilling to 
recommend the alternative. 
 
Lack of personal contact between GPs and consultants at more distant hospitals 
could be a barrier to GPs and patients choosing hospitals further away.  The report 
suggests open days for consultants to present to GPs, which is a good idea in theory 
but in reality might be difficult to manage.  It does however support the idea of trusts 
marketing themselves to raise awareness of surgeons’ special interests and skills.    
Over time this situation may well change, as GPs will increasingly identify better 
services outside their local area through feedback, word-of-mouth and receiving 
promotional literature from trusts.  This suggests that eventually more patients may 
take up the offer of travelling to a hospital further away; however, evidence from 
Europe contradicts this, as locality is still the dominant influencing factor [Hanning 
and Spangberg, 2000; http://www.nhs.uk/magazine, 2002] 
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4.3 CHD choice at six months 
pilot 
 
4.3.1 Overview 
 
The Coronary Heart Disease (CHD) pilot was set up in July 2003 to offer patients the 
choice of moving to an alternative hospital for faster treatment if they had waited for 
more than six months for heart surgery.  Patients were contacted by the originating 
trust and sent a booklet explaining choice and 57% of patients opted for treatment 
elsewhere.  At the outset patients were only offered one alternative, but this 
increased during the scheme until eventually 25% of patients were offered three or 
more choices. 
 
An evaluation report has been written by the Picker Institute Europe for the 
Department of Health, based on the feedback from 3,431 patients who responded to 
a postal questionnaire.    
 
4.3.2 Influencing factors 
 
Younger patients were more prone to take up the offer of choice (61%, as opposed to 
55% for over 60s), and the reputation of the hospital was the most important factor in 
their decision.   Waiting time was the second most important consideration.  For 
patients who chose to remain at their local hospital, the reputation of the hospital was 
even more important than for those who decided to travel to an alternative (78% for 
the former and 65% for the latter).  This difference could be attributed to word of 
mouth or prior experience of local services, or less information being available on the 
alternative providers.   
 
Surprisingly 37% of patients made up their own mind about where to be treated; the 
rest were influenced by their PCA (19%), doctor at home hospital (16%) or friends 
and relatives (15%).  Only 7% said that their GP was influential in their decision.  
PCAs were crucial in the success of the CHD pilot, with 61% of patients who chose 
an alternative provider classing their PCA as excellent (in contrast with 38% who 
stayed at their local hospital).   
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4.3.3 Information  
 
When asked about the information they received there was a noticeable difference in 
survey responses between patients who opted to stay at their local hospital and 
those who decided to travel.  75% of patients who travelled said they received 
enough information to make their choice, whereas only 47% of patients who 
remained at home said this was the case.  Some patients may have felt that they 
lacked sufficient information to make an informed choice, and this discouraged them 
from taking up the offer so they decided to ‘play safe’ and remain at their local 
hospital.  The role of the PCA could also have influenced these responses as there 
was a definite link between the answers to questions concerning information 
provision and those relating to standard of support received from the PCA.   
 
4.3.4 Travel 
 
38% of patients travelled less than one hour for treatment and 35% for two hours or 
longer, while the further the patient had to travel the greater the likelihood that 
transport was provided.  A few patients experienced problems with travel after their 
operation, in terms of delay and discomfort and 20% felt adequate arrangements had 
not been made for their travelling companion   Aftercare was an issue for some, with 
inadequate communication between the receiving and originating trusts, or a 
relinquishing of responsibility by both. 
 
4.2.4 Recommendations 
 
The report has suggested that every patient offered choice should have access to a 
PCA, while lack of information appeared to inhibit the uptake of choice, especially 
when there was only limited information about each surgeon.  Improvements need to 
be made with travel arrangements and communication between parties, as an 
uncomfortable return journey can mar the whole experience for a patient.  More work 
also needs to be done on how patients assess each hospital’s and surgeon’s 
reputation and compare hospitals, as this was not within the scope of the CHD 
evaluation. 
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4.4 Other pilots for long 
waiters 
 
 
4.4.1 Pilot scheme advertising 
 
Advertising for patients waiting for surgery has been successful in a number of 
cases.  The London Patient Choice Project placed adverts in South East London 
newspapers to raise awareness of the scheme, while in 2003 Cumbria and 
Lancashire SHA advertised faster treatment for cataracts.    University College 
Hospital in London attracted patients from Devon, Cornwall and Birmingham after it 
publicised that it had spare capacity for NHS patients.  PCTs from Birmingham and 
the south-west have been sending patients to London, and University College 
Hospital London is considering advertising directly to patients themselves.  There 
was some advertising during the Trent pilot, in the Derby Telegraph and Nottingham 
Evening Post, but the SHA believes the impact of this was not great as most patients 
and GPs had already heard about the project through word of mouth. 
 
The quality and level of detail in the marketing information provided to patients and 
GPs is important.  A Luton GP highlighted the quality of the brochure received from 
Hammersmith hospital during the Luton and Dunstable orthopaedics pilot scheme, 
and believes this was influential in her patients’ decision to go there for treatment.  
The information provided included a glossy brochure with photos, good maps and 
directions and a separate pamphlet explaining each procedure. 14 out of the 15 
patients agreed to travel to Hammersmith instead of staying on the waiting list at 
Luton and Dunstable.  In contrast, a pilot run by Huntingdonshire PCT offering 
patients choice used a basic A4 sheet showing limited information on each hospital, 
such as a photo and a few figures (such as mortality rate).  Not one patient in this 
scheme, run in conjunction with five GP practices, took up the offer of moving to 
another hospital.  Although there will be other factors at play in these cases, such as 
waiting times, the suggestion is that quality of information played an important role.   
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4.4.2 Trent 
 
In the Nottingham pilot, choice was offered to patients waiting for cataract operations. 
This was undertaken through the provision of funding from the Department of Health 
to procure a team of overseas surgeons to conduct cataract surgery, using a theatre 
in the community hospital. Call centres was set up to contact patients and explain the 
choice, and transport was included in the offer. Patients were initially selected from 
six month waiters, and then when this had been successful patients were offered the 
opportunity at the point of referral. To achieve this, half the referral letters from the 
GPs were diverted from the mail room at the Queens medical centre direct to the call 
centre. The PCAs then phoned patients and offered then choice of going to the 
overseas team much sooner, or going onto the QMC waiting list.  
 
A proper assessment is still to be completed but limited initial findings have been 
released.  There was on average a 60% uptake and patients were happy with the 
service.  The overseas team were extremely efficient; conducting 2,300 operations in 
16 weeks; approximately 30 operations in one day, in contrast to 5 in the NHS.  This 
was attributed to the fact that it was a specialist team who were used to working 
together and had no disturbances, from being on call for example. In the NHS the 
theatre team is different each time and there are often problems with theatre 
overrunning, poor quality instruments etc, all of which impede efficiency.  
 
The first 100 patients were contacted after 30 days to evaluate the patient’s 
experience throughout the referral pathway.  Feedback received showed that only 
16% of patients found the information leaflet helpful, 18% did not receive a leaflet 
and the majority, 66%, did not comment on the leaflet or indicate if they had received 
one.  Not all patients were sent a leaflet as most were on hospital waiting lists.  51% 
reported that the Patient Care Advisor was helpful and 6% patients could not recall 
the initial conversation. The remaining patents did not make a comment on the 
Patient Care Advisor. 
 
4.4.3 London Patient Choice Project 
 
The London Patient Choice Project was carried out in collaboration with three NHS 
trusts; Barking, Havering and Redbridge and a number of PCTs.  Under the scheme 
patients who have been waiting six months for treatment were given the option of 
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faster treatment at another NHS hospital, a diagnosis and treatment centre or an 
independent sector hospital. The scheme had managed to cut waiting times for those 
patients opting to go elsewhere from up to a year to less than seven months. Patients 
had to wait for up to a year for treatment in several specialities such as 
ophthalmology, orthopaedics, general surgery and ear, nose and throat (ENT) 
surgery. Additional capacity was developed in other NHS and independent sector 
hospitals and patients who would have waited for up to a year for admission were 
treated earlier. Having this extra capacity enabled the trust to improve on the waiting 
time of patients that remained on its own waiting list. 
 
The process starts with the hospital telling the scheme when they have a patient who 
will soon have waited six months for treatment. The patient is then contacted and 
offered faster treatment by a number of providers and an appointment is agreed with 
the patient on the phone allowing patients to book a time and date that suits them.  
The scheme was initially introduced for ophthalmology patients, was then widened to 
orthopaedic, general surgery and ENT, urology, plastic surgery, oral surgery and 
gynaecology patients. Under the guidelines the PCT pays the same price for 
treatment wherever the patient goes. 
 
The challenges faced by the pilot include: a) business planning was more 
complicated;  b) the PCT was concerned with money leaving the local health 
economy; c) staff at the hospital needed reassurance that post-operative 
complications would be handled by the surgeon carrying out the procedure so that 
they won’t be left with the most complicated treatments [Department of Health, 2003]. 
 
4.4.4 Dorset & Somerset pilot 
 
NHS trusts within Dorset and Somerset faced a considerable challenge in achieving 
local waiting times targets.  Through offering choice they were able to reduce waiting 
times and ensure that national and local waiting time targets were achieved.  Within 
Dorset and Somerset waiting times at 31 March 2003 were a maximum of six months 
for inpatient treatment, except for orthopaedics at two trusts.  At the time of writing 
(May 2004) choice at six months has been implemented in order to maintain these 
maximum waits and reduce orthopaedic waits and choice at the point of referral was 
developed. 
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The management of choice was through the existing performance management and 
planning structures, including the monthly meeting of Chief Executives and the 
regular performance management meetings held with organisations.  Each PCT with 
long waiters, working with the relevant NHS trusts, has set up and managed systems 
for offering choice for patients waiting for treatment at the NHS trusts for which the 
PCT is lead commissioner. At the time of writing (May 2004) three PCTs were 
developing choice at the point of referral, each exploring a slightly different model, as 
part of the choice pilot.  The monitoring of choice is done through regular reporting of 
maximum waiting times at the relevant trust, and by reporting of the numbers offered 
and accepting choice. 
 
4.4.5 Greater Manchester 
 
The scope of the Manchester pilot was to offer Choice at six months in three 
specialities – General surgery, Orthopaedics and ENT.  Having undertaken an 
analysis of longer waiters and wanting to develop resources that were Greater 
Manchester related (for all patients offered choice) they opted for three treatment 
centres across Manchester.  Choice is being offered initially in a new treatment 
centre, Greater Manchester Surgical Centre at Trafford General Hospital. 
 
4.4.6 West Yorkshire 
 
The West Yorkshire pilot focuses on choice for patients requiring cataract surgery.  
Focussing initially on long waiters, the target was that by April 2004 all West 
Yorkshire patients requiring cataract surgery will be offered the choice of at least one 
alternative provider at the point of referral. The pilot included the arrangement and 
subsequent management of a cataract service from Westwood Park, a primary care 
based Diagnostic and Treatment Centre, as well as ensuring the co-ordination of 
cataract activity and waiting times across all West Yorkshire within the choice 
framework. To accommodate the increased cataract activity – together with other 
service developments – the refurbishment and extension of Westwood Park was 
undertaken. 
 
The project was phased as follows.  In Phase 1 current arrangements already in 
place at Westwood Park were used as building blocks where visiting clinical teams 
from some of the provider trusts in West Yorkshire provide a service on behalf of the 
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PCT.  This has provided an opportunity for clinical teams to work together and 
experience Westwood Park for themselves. Phase 2 was the planning of the clinical 
protocols and patient pathway to deliver choice at point of referral from December 
2005. Once the pathways are agreed, they hope to be in a position to determine the 
most appropriate staffing model. 
 
4.4.7 Berkshire pilot 
 
There are two separate streams to the Berkshire Choice pilot. The first phase is 
offering timed choice for patients waiting six months. The two local hospitals for most 
of their referrals are Heatherwood and Wexham park hospital and Royal Berkshire 
and Battle Hospitals (RBBH). 
 
The surgical specialties covered by the pilot include plastic surgery; general surgery; 
ENT, dermatology surgery and MRI scans. Although all patients waiting over six 
months at RBBH or Heatherwood and Wexham are offered choice, there are certain 
clinical criteria’s which would make patients ineligible and the view of the originating 
and receiving consultants over the suitability for treatment.  As contracts for the pilot 
are between the PCT’s and the receiving trusts, money is not currently available for 
transport.  Accommodation for carers accompanying patients would also not normally 
be provided unless made by receiving trusts. 
 
The main challenges the pilot foresees when delivering choice would be one of 
communicating this new concept to patients and Payment by Results, which will 
create a certain amount of competition i.e. a fundamental cultural change in the way 
patient services are delivered. 
 
 
4.5 Shorter waits to see a GP 
 
Hopwood House Practice in Oldham has reduced the time patients wait to see a GP 
from around five days to less than one by improving the way it manages demand. It 
achieved the turnaround after taking part in the National Primary Care Collaborative 
[Department of Health, 2003].  In the past patients were waiting up to five days for a 
routine appointment with a GP and staff were under pressure because they were 
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dealing with frustrated patients and felt the workload was out of control. Through the 
national collaborative, patients are now encouraged to get telephone advice from a 
practice nurse before making a GP appointment saving between 55 and 80 GP 
appointments a month. Practice nurses were given responsibility for treatment 
changes for patients with hypertension. The receptionists undergo some of the health 
care assistant training modules so they now do many of the routine tasks previously 
done by the practice nurse. These include running the chronic disease register. 
Telephone consultations with GPs were introduced and these last an average of 
three minutes compared with the in-person consultations which last up to nine 
minutes. The duplication of work was stopped - for example keeping written records 
of tests - because the computer system can manage the process. 
 
The above changes have created the flexibility so that for routine appointments, 
patients are seen within 24 hours and usually get an appointment on the same day. 
The challenges faced on this pilot were staff concerns that the changes might add 
additional pressure on them as well as the time required by the practice to monitor 
demand, test ideas, and draw up contingency plans. 
 
 
4.6 Keeping inpatient waits 
under 12 months 
 
Bradford Hospitals NHS Trust has ensured that, for the past three years, none of its 
patients have waited more than twelve months for inpatient or day case care. This is 
despite a significant increase in the number of patients seeking treatment. 
Unfortunately increasingly shorter waiting times for outpatient clinics further 
increased the numbers waiting for inpatient and day case care.  
 
In order to tackle this problem the trust: 
• Developed strong modelling and forecasting techniques to plot demand and a 
robust annual capacity plan. This was done in close collaboration with PCTs.  
• Recruited more staff. For example, during 2002/2003 it had recruited two more 
general surgeons, two more plastic surgeons, two more orthopaedic surgeons, 
plus additional theatre and support staff including nurses and anaesthetists.  
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• Encouraged Consultants to carry out more outreach work, establishing 
partnerships with the increasing number of GPs with a special interest (GPSIs). 
As a result, 15,000 minor operations which used to be done in hospital were 
carried out in primary care. 
• The ophthalmology service was redesigned to improve the patient’s care pathway 
and speed up the referral process. As a result, patients can now be referred for 
cataract surgery by an optometrist, which meant they no longer needed separate 
outpatient appointment. The service redesign work also showed additional 
capacity was needed to meet demand and an additional ophthalmic surgeon and 
team were recruited into the trust. Together, the reforms and additional 
investment had cut waits from more than twelve months to nine months. 
 
The main challenges on this pilot were capital not being available to expand the 
number of theatres, wards and beds at the trust as well as the trust working hard to 
enable staff to understand the importance of change and encourage them to 
embrace new ways of working.  
 
 
4.7 Shorter waits to see a 
consultant 
 
In Bournemouth, the lengths of time patients have to wait to arrange for an 
appointment with a consultant has been reduced from six weeks to less than 15 
minutes following the introduction of an electronic booking system (EBS). The system 
links 22 GP surgeries to Royal Bournemouth Hospital’s computerised appointment 
system. 
 
In the past patients were waiting up to six weeks to receive a letter confirming an 
appointment with a hospital consultant. It also used to take up to two weeks for GPs' 
referral letters to arrive at the hospital and a further four weeks for the consultants to 
prioritise the case and send out an appointment letter.  By linking the 22 GP practices 
to the hospital appointment system via a computer and through developing 17 
referral protocols in consultation with consultants and GPs the following results were 
achieved: 
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• Patients could now arrange a time and date for an appointment that suits them 
while they are in the doctor’s surgery. The process takes only 15 minutes instead 
of six weeks.  
• GPs no longer have to write referral letters or wait for the consultant to prioritise 
the case and send out an appointment letter.  
• Practice clerical staff do not need to write letters or chase up the hospital about 
appointments. The system prints off appointment information that can be given to 
the patient there and then.  
• The system shows appointment cancellations, which means some patients can 
be seen as quickly as the next day whereas in the past these slots were wasted.  
• Missing patient notes have become a thing of the past. GPs fill in the protocol 
electronically so the consultant has the relevant notes on their computer screen 
when the patient arrives.  
 
The challenges faced include:  
• GPs were sceptical about whether the system would work properly or take up 
more time during their consultations with patients.  
• GPs needed to dedicate time to training, which varied depending on how 
computer literate they were.  
• Setting up the 17 protocols for the system required detailed consultation with both 
consultants and GPs requiring a considerable amount of time from both. 
 
 
4.8 Summary of pilot schemes 
 
A major consideration in all these examples, excluding the Dr Foster pilot, is that they 
were offering faster treatment to patients waiting already on the waiting list, so there 
was a greater incentive for patients to travel and therefore the results are not 
necessarily representative of choice at the referral stage.  This also applies to 
successful advertising initiatives, as these were attracting long waiters rather than 
patients at the point of referral. 
 
Patients valued the offer of choice and the feeling of being involved in decisions 
about their health even when they chose to remain at their local hospital, so this is 
step towards the NHS aim of empowering patients.  The local hospital is important to 
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patients for three reasons.  Firstly, ease of access is a factor, not just for patients but 
also for friends and relatives who wish to visit.  Secondly, the level of trust is higher; 
word-of-mouth and previous experience proved to be prime factors influencing 
patients’ perception of quality, and in addition GPs’ knowledge of and trust for local 
services is built up over time and from face-to-face contact with consultants.  Thirdly, 
aftercare is easier at the local hospital and there will be continuity in the service 
provided, and since this was a concern for patients and GPs it provides another 
reason to choose the local hospital.   There are therefore significant ties between 
local hospitals and their population. 
 
An interesting point discovered in the CHD pilot was that 37% of patients made up 
their own mind and 19% were influenced by their PCA, with the GP playing a minor 
role.   
 
Experience in the pilot scheme in Bradford suggested that although outpatient 
waiting times dropped, inpatient and day case times increased; therefore there may 
be a trade-off in meeting waiting time targets as waits elsewhere may rise.  
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5 Literature 
review 
 
 
There follows a critical assessment of choice based on a literature review of think-
tanks, academic papers and policy commentators, with evidence from choice in 
healthcare around the world. 
 
 
5.1 Impetus for change 
 
Cohen describes the NHS as “the bureaucratic equivalent of Mao’s China … 
successive governments wait just long enough for a kind of order to be restored after 
each reorganisational crisis before reorganising again … the logic of permanent 
revolution obliges another radical reform” [Cohen, 2003].  Kieran Walshe, a specialist 
in NHS bureaucracy and advisor to the Commons Health Select Committee, writes 
that the NHS has become “a shanty town in which structures and systems are 
cobbled together or thrown up hastily in the knowledge that they will be torn down in 
due course” [Walshe, 2003].  He documents changes in the NHS over last two 
decades, concluding that most are nothing but a repackaging of old ideas, driven by 
the political desire to be seen to be reforming the health service and using structural 
change as the most obvious way to do this. However these changes only scrape the 
surface with no real improvement, but instead consume valuable resources and instil 
in management a sense of change resistance and a short term outlook.  “The 
Government is so obsessed with the need to achieve short-term results like reducing 
waiting times for non-urgent surgery that it is subjecting the NHS to counter-
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productive top-down reorganisation imposed under the guise of modernisation and 
decentralisation” [Jones, 2003].  It has been suggested that choice is a ruse to retain 
middle class voters, who want to feel that they can exercise choice within the NHS 
rather than being driven to take out private health insurance, which would result in 
them losing interest in the state of the NHS and thus the Labour Party [Mohan, 2003].   
 
Another criticism of reforms over the last two decades has been the speed of 
change, so that even if pilots have been run the results have not necessarily been 
properly assessed, if at all, or incorporated into the roll-out [Walshe, 2003; Kings 
Fund, 2003].  Sir Andrew Foster of the Audit Commission said in a recent interview: “I 
worry about the sheer mass of structural change there has been . . . and whether that 
will really bring the result that is needed . . . one of my experiences of 30 years in 
public service is that setting up these new institutions and getting them working well 
always takes two to three years, and longer than people hope. People become 
preoccupied with establishing them, and politicians very often then become 
impatient, and before you know it there are calls for further change. There is a 
danger of people getting slightly punch drunk about the amount of change … Some 
of the mechanisms being created are similar to those introduced a decade ago then 
scrapped” [Foster, 2003].  Others have said that spending has been politically 
motivated to grab the media’s attention by, for example, building new hospitals, 
rather than investing in the actual running of the service [Due, 2002].   
 
 
5.2 Decentralisation 
 
Walshe has also suggested that the UK cannot have a world class health service 
without transferring power to the frontline.  “No other comparable European country 
has a health service run by central government, even in countries where the state 
plays just as large a role in funding healthcare through taxation” [Walshe, 2003].  The 
NHS Plan promised that investment will be accompanied by a restructuring of the 
NHS to meet user requirements and devolve power to local areas.  Part of this has 
been attempted by the devolution of resources to PCTs; however, there are 
restrictions on their use of resources.   
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The Kings Fund has highlighted a number of weaknesses in the current structure of 
PCTs and “evidence suggests that PCTs are struggling to achieve all that is 
expected of them” [Lewis et al., 2003].  The Kings Fund has found that central policy 
initiatives, from NSFs to NICE guidance, have absorbed most of the money allocated 
to developing local services.  Nick Bromley from the Centre for Reform believes that 
PCTs are too small, and the budgets similarly too small, to absorb fluctuating 
demands for health care, especially for one-off expensive cases [Bromley et al., 
2003].  Financial pressure from emergent technology and new drugs will drive PCTs 
to demonstrate better value for money [Campbell, 2004] and patient needs could 
potentially suffer as a consequence.  Strategic decisions are still made by the 
Department of Health, dictated to the SHAs and thence to the PCTs, so in reality the 
top-down autocracy remains, with central assessment and regulation.    PCTs must 
juggle these conflicting priorities while ensuring equal access, especially as 
“encouraging patient choice runs the risk that the choices of the few rather than the 
needs of the many will determine the trajectory of hospital development” [Mohan, 
2003].  The few are still likely to be middle-class, educated and the younger 
generations, so it is important that their needs do not dominate the development of 
local services.  
 
“As consumers are increasingly offered choice … the commissioning role of PCTs 
diminishes.  For elective care, the commissioning will increasingly take place in the 
GP’s consulting room”.  Although PCTs will have selected a list for GPs, the actual 
choice will reside with the GP and patient so this will further erode PCTs’ power.  
“The change to trust status seems to have reduced the influence of general 
practitioners on the governance of PCTs and therefore the priority attached to 
developing primary care” [Lewis et al, 2003].  Therefore rather than the smooth 
integration of primary and secondary care under PCTs this may become more 
fragmented.  Concern has also been expressed over how PCTs will arbitrate 
between different GP interests [OECD, 2003]. 
 
Foundation Trusts were a step towards offering hospitals greater autonomy and 
freedom from political dictates.  “They represent an attempt to ‘internalise’ 
stakeholders and to shift the power from those that provide or commission services 
to those that receive them” [Lewis, 2003].  Foundation Trusts have a board of 
governors drawn from the local community and are responsible to an independent 
regulator.  The Government is hoping that Foundation Trusts will empower local 
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communities in services where choice is hard to accommodate, such as emergency 
care, as services will be responsive to local needs [Reid, 2003].  However, it has 
been argued that there is friction between ruling party accountability to parliament, 
with its requirement to know every detail of the day-to-day running, and a locally-
managed and independently regulated health service [Walshe, 2003]: ”a pull from the 
centre tends to reassert itself when governments try to decentralise” [Roll, 2003].   
GPs act as gatekeepers to secondary care and form the vital link between patients 
and specialist services.  However, the traditional relationship between GP and patient 
is gradually being eroded by increasing usage of out-of-hours services, walk-in 
centres and NHS Direct.  It has been argued that the authority of doctors is also in 
decline, due in part to wider availability of information for patients and the rise of 
consumerism [Gray and Rutter, 2003].  Unlike the rest of the NHS, where doctors are 
salaried, GPs have so far retained their independence, but the government is 
gradually breaking up their monopoly of primary care and estimates that by 2005 the 
majority of GPs will be salaried [UCL, 2003].  GPs are, inevitably, unenthusiastic 
about what they see as attempts to undermine their authority, and expressed 
concern that this will detract from the personal relationship they have with patients so 
that in the end it is the patients who will suffer.  A recent survey by the Institute for 
Public Policy Research (Ippr) and the College of Health has found that patients today 
are on the whole “more willing to question their doctor and much less deferential, 
which can bring real benefits” [Ippr, 2001].   
 
 
5.3 Quality 
 
It has been suggested that CHAI will scrap the controversial star ratings system in 
2006 when the deadline is reached for the current set of targets [Shifrin, 2004], 
abolishing the 62 targets and replacing them with 24 wider ‘quality objectives’.  This 
has been welcomed by healthcare professionals, who claim that the targets to 
achieve star ratings distort clinical priorities.  The Chairman of the British Medical 
Association has said of star ratings “they are a system of measuring political targets 
rather than what patients want” [Johnson, 2004].  The Audit Commission proved that 
in most instances the star rating bears no resemblance to how good a hospital is 
from the point of view of patient care, as they are more concerned with internal 
processes.  Other complaints revolve around the view that the targets for star ratings 
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present a crude, over-simplistic picture of performance.  There has therefore been a 
positive reaction to the introduction of a common, more general set of healthcare 
standards: “independent sector hospitals work to transparent, detailed, national 
minimum standards, while NHS hospitals work to wide-ranging, less explicit 
principles and guidance.  If all hospitals operate under the same set of minimum 
standards it will be clear to patients if a hospital fails to meet patient care and quality 
expectations” [Henson, 2004]. 
 
Consumer health information was pioneered in the US, with organisations such as 
Planetree among the first to provide information services to support patient choice 
[Shepperd, Charnock and Gann, 1999].  In the US a combination of information, 
publication and choice has been a powerful weapon in improving clinical outcomes 
[Lilley, 2000].  Patients and GPs in Denmark were initially deterred from taking up 
choice due to the limited information available to them [http://www.nhs.uk/magazine, 
2002].  GPs have stipulated that if any of the providers offered under choice are 
hospitals they are not familiar with then they will require details of all the consultants 
in a specialty, including particular interests of each, and GPs do not have the time or 
the inclination to research.  For these reasons, the resources supplied to GPs and 
patients are vital to assist informed choices.   
 
Patients are generally tolerant of short and moderate waits, and it is the general 
public who expresses more concern about waiting.  [Hurst and Siciliani, 2003; Derrett 
et al., 1997].  Six months has been classed as the approximate threshold before a 
wait is too long, depending on the severity of the symptoms [Derrett et al., 1997].  
Evidence also suggests that “once patient choice has been in place for two to three 
years and waiting times tend to even out, the incentive provided by shorter waits will 
be limited.  It may even disappear if the Government does succeed in its aim of 
driving down waiting times across the board.  In those circumstances, choice 
between hospitals will depend on other factors, particularly quality of care” [Harrison 
and Appelby, 2004].   Waiting times were a key factor influencing GPs during the 
fundholding days [Propper, Croxson and Shearer, 2002], so it is likely that this will be 
similar under patient choice, but there is also likely to be a trade-off between waiting 
time and continuity of care. 
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5.4 Restrictions on choice 
 
Patient choice in its present form is extremely restricted, limited to a narrow range of 
hospitals for elective surgery only.  “Where patients can exercise choice easily (for 
example, in elective surgery) the consumerist model will be adopted … (whereby) 
health care users influence services by exercising choice rather than by ‘owning’ the 
provider itself … The current patient choice initiative offers choice to consumers 
within a broad market framework although, to date, these choices are primarily 
focused on the location of treatment and its timing” [Lewis, 2003].  The Government 
has been accused of taking the easy way out in offering patients choice of hospital as 
“elective care is but a small part of total NHS provision” [Coulter, 2003], although it 
has always attracted a disproportionate amount of the Government’s attention.    
 
There has been a shift since the nineteenth century from infectious to chronic 
diseases - CHD, respiratory diseases, cancer, diabetes - which are extremely costly 
to treat, and the UK performs poorly in comparison with other countries [Wanless, 
2003].  The real challenge to choice will be its extension into these areas of chronic 
care, which is not just a case of offering patients a choice of hospital.  “Emergency 
care and the management of patients with chronic diseases are less amenable to 
simple market-based solutions” [Lewis, Dixon and Gillam, 2003].  Patients could, for 
example, be offered a choice in the type of treatment or care they receive [Ippr, 
2002], rather than an automatic appointment in secondary care, and this would also 
cut down on unnecessary referrals.  It has been estimated that around 50% of GP 
referrals do not lead to surgery as there are a number of inefficiencies in the system, 
possibly by GPs referring to a consultant out of habit [Thames Valley SHA, 2004].  A 
pilot scheme is being undertaken with Somerset PCT to streamline the referral 
process: once a patient has seen their GP and been referred, they will be directed to 
a Referral Management Centre, a call centre managed by health professionals, who 
decide whether to refer the patient to therapy, a specialist nurse or a consultant.  
There are generally alternatives for ongoing care for non-urgent cases and these 
need to be identified.   
 
“There is an irreconcilable conflict in the NHS between allowing individual patients 
unconstrained choice of treatments that are free at the point of use, and the 
allocation of resources in a cost-effective manner … the benefits of extending choice 
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are almost always at the expense of other benefits … greater choice may lead to 
reduced quality" (Appelby, 2003].  It is vital for maintaining the principle of equity to 
guarantee a minimum standard across the board, rather than aim to drive up quality 
in some areas and risk a decline in others.  It is probable that there will be excessive 
demand for elective surgery in a publicly insured health system [Hurst and Siciliani, 
2003].  “The point of insurance is that the insured person does not bear the full cost 
of treatment received.  The associated ‘moral hazard’ implies a propensity to 
consume beyond the social optimum” [Docteur and Oxley, 2003].  This is in 
opposition to the wish to improve efficiency in the NHS and make patients more 
responsible users of resources.   
 
In all healthcare systems around the world there is restriction on individual choice for 
this reason.  In the US, financial restrictions by a patient’s insurer affect the choice of 
provider [Appleby, Harrison and Devlin, 2003].  Pilot schemes have been run 
successfully by Kaiser Permanente, the US healthcare provider, where patients 
accepted reduced choice, to prove the theory that unlimited choice is not necessarily 
positive [Ippr, 2001].  In Denmark, choice is effectively limited as, although patients 
waiting over two months can choose to go privately or to travel overseas, no advice 
or support is offered and there is no help with travel costs 
[http://www.nhs.uk/magazine, 2002].  Free choice of hospital has been advocated in 
Norway since 2001, but patients cannot go to a hospital with a higher degree of 
specialisation than the one to which they were initially referred [OECD, 2003]. 
 
It has been argued that “real choice can only be  provided if there is surplus 
provision, which may be OK for general goods and services but is inefficient and 
massively more costly when it comes to essential public services dependent on 
highly skilled staff and complex equipment” [Jones, 2003].  Although increased 
capacity, in terms of more beds and consultants, has been shown to be associated 
with shorter waiting times [Martin and Smith, 1999], it requires a commitment to build 
new units and recruit and train staff, which will take several years [Hurst and Siciliani, 
2003].   There is still as shortage of frontline staff in the NHS.  Last year figures for 
management increased by 60%, in contrast to 22% and 21% respectively for doctors 
and nurses; there are therefore fears that the record amount of funding is being 
siphoned off into bureaucracy [Hope, 2004].  A problem with introducing marketing 
mechanisms is that the scarce resource hospitals will want to compete for is trained 
and talented staff [Cohen, 2003].  
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5.5 Competition 
 
There is very little evidence on the impact of competition in health care.  The current 
Government has been criticised for a return to the Conservative’s ‘internal market’ 
[Laurance, 2002], but tariffs will remove the price-based competition that existed in 
the 1990s.  Activity-based payments have been recommended as a way of raising 
productivity because providers have an incentive to increase the volume of activity, 
with evidence from Norway showing a growth in hospital activity without any increase 
in expenditure [Biorn et al., 2002]. Conflicting evidence from the fundholding days 
implies that competition resulted in little real improvement in waiting times, outcomes 
or quality [Smee, Mays et al., 2000]; in fact Propper (2002) has shown that death 
rates were higher in hospitals where the potential for competition was strongest.  This 
generally applied to cities, since competition in health care markets is geographically-
based [Burgess et al., 2003], so areas such as London will face greater competition 
than Bedfordshire.  However, “a fall in quality should be matched by a fall in costs 
and research has shown that competition in the UK health care market has been 
associated with lower costs and prices” [Burgess et al., 2003], showing that there are 
advantages.  The British Medical Association also has fears that competition will 
discourage knowledge sharing of medical breakthroughs and best practice between 
trusts.   
 
Unison has expressed doubts about a market for healthcare services because of the 
enticement of selecting only the profitable patients and services, therefore further 
reducing equity.  “The problem is that fee-for-service creates opposing incentives 
among commissioners and providers – one seeking cost containment, the other 
income maximisation through competition and the careful selection of patients” [UCL, 
2003].  The Government is considering adjusting tariffs for length of stay, and this 
would remove a potential obstacle to hospitals to taking on more complex cases as 
they would be adequately remunerated; however it must be ensured that trusts do 
not reject certain patients or procedures for financial reasons.  In Germany, for 
example, insurance companies compete for patients and measures have to be put in 
place to avoid selection of the healthiest patients and refusal of the needy.   
 
Some policy commentators are worried about tariffs because cost data is poor in the 
NHS so it is dangerous to base prices on this information and equally risky to force 
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hospitals to adhere to set national prices [Bromley et al., 2003].  The next few years 
could be financially unsettling for trusts, as presently there are significant variations in 
each hospital’s costs in relation to tariff, some as much as 20% above and some 
20% below [Appleby, Harrison, Devlin, 2003].  There will be no measures to protect 
hospitals if there is a shift in patients’ demands and the hospital loses business as 
the Government deemed this unnecessary.  With the length of waiting lists at 
present, trusts already have several months’ leeway, so if in the unlikely event that 
they receive no referrals under choice, then they have a few months to resolve this 
before the supply of patients runs out.   
 
 
5.6 Patient choice in other 
countries 
 
The OECD has compared waiting times for elective surgery across OECD countries 
and contrasted various policies for tackling excessive waits [Hurst and Siciliani, 
2003].  This concludes that there is not necessarily a correlation between waiting lists 
and waiting times: it is possible for lists to increase while actual times reduce. 
Another point is that the achievement of maximum waiting time guarantees may be at 
the expense of increasing the outpatient waiting time.  Failed initiatives in Sweden 
and Norway have brought to light inadequate prioritisation of the needy, while 
another scheme trialled in Norway attempted to reduce waiting times for patients on 
sick leave and therefore reduce the cost of sickness benefit; a figure estimated at 5-
10% in the UK [Harrison and New, 2000].  “Constraints on capacity are desirable to 
achieve optimum surgery rates and prevent supply from matching this demand … It 
can be cost-effective to maintain short queues of elective patients because the 
adverse health consequences of short delays are small and there are savings in 
hospital capacity from allowing queues to form”.  Measures to reduce waits by 
increasing activity will, over a period of time, lead to demand increasing and waiting 
times back to where they were before [Hurst and Siciliani, 2003].  Clinical 
prioritisation is not practiced under choice, but surgeons’ and GPs’ thresholds for 
admission can vary lists and therefore waiting times, as well as ensuring that the 
least needy wait the longest [Hurst and Siciliani, 2003].   
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Experience in other countries has been that the impact of patient choice has been 
negligible and it has been observed that patient mobility tends to be low: in Sweden, 
for example, few patients opted for private treatment when offered choice after waits 
of longer than three months [Hanning and Spangberg, 2000].  Choice has been 
available in the Netherlands for three years, but most patients choose to go to their 
local hospital.  Norway has sent a number of patients abroad for treatment over the 
course of many years but with no obvious reduction in waiting times [Hurst and 
Siciliani, 2003].  Since 1993 patients in Denmark have been able to go to a private 
hospital or abroad if a public hospital cannot treat them within two to four months; 
however only 5% of patients have exercised their right of choice 
[http://www.nhs.uk/magazine, 2002].   
 
 
5.7 Summary 
 
The majority of commentators feel that patient choice is a repackaging of old ideas 
and therefore should not have much of an impact.  Some have expressed concern 
that the pilot schemes will not be properly assessed or the findings not used to 
influence the choice agenda.  Other comments relating to the short-term focus and 
change resistance endemic in the NHS culture imply that there will be significant 
obstacles to overcome for the choice initiative to be accepted.  Even with recent 
reforms there has been no real decentralisation and PCTs’ power is limited. Since 
there will no prioritisation of patients, it will be essential to provide adequate support 
for those who most require it or choice will be limited to the informed, educated and 
articulate patients. 
There is also likely to be a trade-off, so increased choice may even reduce quality 
instead of improving it, with the added issue of competition discouraging 
collaboration amongst trusts.  Elective surgery is only a small part of the work of the 
NHS yet is in the spotlight.  If trusts are too focused on this area there is there is the 
danger that it will be at the expense of other services.  The introduction of wider 
quality standards in place of star ratings should benefit trusts as they can be more 
clinically focused and patients if there are true measures of hospital performance. 
A Review of Patient Choice in the NHS   
 
 
 
 
45 
 
 
 
 
6 Alternative 
healthcare 
systems 
 
 
Although all OECD countries rely heavily on both public provision of insurance and 
on public regulation of various aspects of healthcare [Docteur and Oxley, 2003], the 
UK is one of the only countries in the world to fund healthcare purely through 
taxation, although some services in the NHS incur charges – prescriptions, dentistry, 
orthodontics, fertility treatment and long-term care for example.  The majority of 
European countries run their healthcare through social insurance and it has been 
argued that tax funding alone is insufficient to provide a quality service: “the UK 
should take note of the world’s experience and move towards a mixed funding model, 
adopting compulsory social insurance.  This will preserve equity, the greatest 
strength of the NHS, and increase transparency, provide choice and empower users 
... co-payments systems can encourage patients to be more responsible users of 
healthcare” [Adam Smith Institute, 2000].   
 
However, the World Health Organisation has commended the UK for having one of 
the fairest systems in the world for funding healthcare [NHS Plan, 2000], and the way 
in which a health system is financed affects equity [Docteur and Oxley, 2003].  Figure 
4 shows the differences in public and private expenditure on healthcare for European 
countries.  There has been no realistic alternative to the NHS model if the ideal of 
free care for all is to be preserved.  In the NHS Plan the Government specifically 
points out that “the systems used by other countries do not provide a route to better 
healthcare … (we have) examined other forms of funding healthcare and found them 
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wanting” [The NHS Plan, Department of Health].  The 2002 budget also reaffirmed 
the commitment to central taxation for funding the NHS [Unison, 2003].   
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Figure 4: Public and private expenditure on healthcare as a percentage of GDP 
 
The UK still contributes significantly less of GDP to healthcare than the average for 
OECD countries, as shown by Figure 5.  The US spends the greatest percentage of 
GDP on healthcare, with a system dependent on social insurance (as in Switzerland, 
the second highest), and the service is efficient, fast and the level of quality high.  
However, the insurance companies go over every item with a fine toothcomb and 
rarely pay the full amount for any procedure.  Research shows that medical 
expenses are the second most common cause of bankruptcy in the US [Warren, 
Westbrook and Sullivan, 2000].  In stark contrast, an American patient can be seen 
quickly in a medical centre in their local shopping mall - many of which even have the 
latest technology and x-ray machines on site.  There is a huge divide between some 
patients receiving fast, quality care whereas approximately 45 million people, 
predominantly the working poor [Unison, 2003], are denied access. 
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Figure 5: Total healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP [OECD Health Database 
2003] 
 
Germany spends more than the EU average on health, employing 12% of the entire 
workforce [Walker, 2001].  German governments have traditionally seen spending on 
public services as priority [Charter, 2001], and Germans tend to value social 
solidarity, even at the expense of high taxes [Walker, 2001].  However, the 
combination of an increasingly ageing population, expensive new technology and 
drugs means that state insurance funds are no longer adequate [Boyes, 2001]. There 
is an urgent need for more responsible use: German patients consult several 
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different doctors for the same condition, while millions of x-rays are taken each year 
without medical justification.  Doctors, encouraged by the pharmaceutical companies, 
are over-prescribing expensive drugs, while some hospitals have to wait six months 
or more for bills to be settled by the state insurance [Boyes, 2001].     
 
Lack of funding is not necessarily the problem, however, as even in Norway, one of 
the richest countries in the world, people have to wait months for serious treatment 
such as heart surgery [Ippr, 2001].  Inefficient distribution of money is the major issue 
in Germany [Boyes, 2001], and this is applicable to the UK.  Inappropriate incentives 
have also been blamed by the OECD for existing problems with healthcare systems, 
and there is insufficient information about the impact of previous reform attempts by 
countries to guide new initiatives [OECD, 2003].   
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7 Conclusion 
 
 
Patients’ decisions not to travel have in many instances been attributed to insufficient 
information, as where this is lacking then the GP is more likely to recommend the 
local hospital.  Although PCAs have proved to be influential in the pilots and helped 
to overcome this issue, in reality it will not be feasible to offer the same level of 
support when choice is available for all, so this will further limit the number of patients 
willing to travel.   
 
Research has shown that patients value local services, therefore if waiting times are 
reduced then location will become the priority and patients are likely to opt for their 
local hospital.  Evidence that patients will travel is from choice for long waiters, so not 
necessarily applicable to choice at the referral stage, and the little evidence for 
choice at referral is from Europe, where the impact has been small.  Payment by 
Results is designed to be an incentive for trusts to increase activity and efficiency, 
but if most patients are unwilling to travel there is limit to the extra activity hospitals 
will be able to attract.  The two main opportunities for hospitals under choice are 
therefore to increase activity through taking on patients from PCTs struggling with 
choice at six months and to find areas to improve efficiency and cost-effectiveness to 
maximise the benefit from tariffs.  One way of improving efficiency could be to have 
dedicated teams performing specific operations on one day a week, as was trialled 
by Trent PCT using an overseas team.  Another area for exploration is to increase 
day surgery and perform more work in the community and in primary care.  
 
Patients valued the offer of choice even if they opted for treatment in their local 
hospital so satisfaction with the NHS may improve as patients feel they are being 
involved in decisions.  The concept of a responsive, personalised health service with 
choice for patients is commendable in theory, but in reality there are a number of 
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insurmountable obstacles.  There is a tension between choice and equity of access, 
as there will be no prioritisation of patients.  Evidence points towards a possible drop 
in standards with increased competition, which is the opposite of the Government’s 
intention to improve quality in the NHS.  It is also possible that reducing waiting times 
to six months will be at the expense of waiting times elsewhere, as experience shows 
there will be a trade off.    
 
For choice to be successful a cultural change is necessary, and this will only happen 
in the long-term, if at all, as due to the amount of change in the NHS in recent years 
patient choice will be seen as a short-term measure and possibly not given adequate 
time or attention before the next policy replaces it.  There is a still the need to 
address long-term capacity; many solutions offered have been short-term, such as 
using overseas teams and the private sector.  Finally, NHS resources, particularly 
nursing staff, are limited in spite of the record levels of investment in recent years, 
and if the Government is serious about keeping the funding model that exists today 
then there is an urgent requirement for greater efficiency.   
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